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Introduction: The Great War and Private Law 
 
Michael Lobban 
  
If the Great War which broke out in August 1914 had been a long time coming, the Great 
Powers nevertheless stumbled into the conflict without much prior co-ordinated preparation for 
a war which would be like none which had preceded it, in the sheer scale and size of military 
and manpower commitments. Faced with similar problems of mobilising military forces, 
securing defence at home, and maintaining a functioning economy, the major western powers 
adopted similar kinds of legislation, running from the grant of emergency powers to the state 
(allowing it to curtail civil liberties and seize private property), to restrictions on freedom of 
contract and free trade, and eventually to the growth of state control over the economy and 
enterprise unimaginable to most of the political classes in 1913.  
 
Many of these developments were unplanned.  It was far from evident in August 1914 that 
state intervention would grow to the degree it had by the Armistice. In the first autumn of the 
war, many in England anticipated that the fighting would be over by Christmas, and that - 
military hostilities aside - it should be ‘business as usual’.  One journal commented in 
November 1914 that ‘legal matters affect lawyers and the civil population, and should be 
carried on with as little disturbance as is consistent with the effectiveness of military 
operations’.1 But the notion that business could be carried on as usual was somewhat utopian. 
The outbreak of war itself severely disrupted much economic activity, as both credit and trade 
across borders was interrupted. In France, which (unlike Britain) already had conscription, the 
mass mobilisation of August 1914 brought general economic activity to a standstill, as 
                                                 
1
 (1914) 59 Solicitor’s Journal 36. ‘It is important to keep in mind two principles,’ it noted in 
November 1914, ‘first that war should not interrupt business relations further than is necessary 
to prevent assistance being given to the enemy; and secondly, that war and its effects should be 
confined as far as possible to the armed forces of the belligerents.’ Ibid 83. 
resources - and especially manpower - were diverted to supporting an all-out-offensive which it 
was hoped would bring the war to a swift conclusion.
2
 By the time economic activity was 
resumed, German forces had occupied much of northern France, home to many industries 
crucial for the war effort, including coal, steel and engineering. In such conditions, civilian and 
military matters could hardly be separated. In a new era of total war, the very outcome of 
hostilities would be determined less by prowess on the field of battle than by the economic 
strength of the state, and its ability to maintain a moral climate domestically to support the 
massive mobilisation required.
3
 This new form of war clearly had an impact on the world of 
property, contract and obligations, as new forms of regulation and state control interfered in 
areas hitherto left largely to the private lawyers. At the same time, new problems created by 
war generated new doctrinal difficulties which needed to be resolved by the courts, and which 
fed their way into private law doctrine, to remain there even after state interference had 
subsided in the post war era. 
 
The articles in this collection set out to explore the impact of the Great War on private law in 
France, Austria, Italy, Germany, Great Britain
4
 and the Netherlands. Each of the belligerent 
states faced similar problems of mobilizing the economy to produce the munitions needed at 
the front, while at the same time keeping the home population fed. Neutral countries like the 
Netherlands were as affected by the disruption of the pre-war transnational economy (through 
blockades and embargoes) as the belligerents. If the general challenges faced by the countries 
                                                 
2
 After August 1914, ‘[m]ost firms retained on average only one-third of their pre-1914 
workforce’: Leonard V Smith, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, France and the 
Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 61. 
3
 See the essays in Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (eds), The Economics of World War 
I (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
4
 The essay in this collection by Catharine MacMillan focuses on English law, but the 
introduction addresses the wider legislation which affected Scotland as well. 
examined were similar, they varied according to context.  Equally, the six countries studied 
here had varying legal traditions - common law versus civil law countries, with either older or 
more recent codifications - as well as varying experiences of war. As shall be seen, while in 
many respects, these countries responded in very similar ways to the problems generated by the 
war, the contrasts between their responses can be as interesting as the similarities. 
 
The six studies which follow are detailed examinations of the experience of particular counties. 
This introduction aims to set the scene for these developments, and draw some comparisons 
between the experiences described here. 
 
I 
 
At the outbreak of war, each country saw the rapid implementation of legislation allowing for 
emergency powers. On 4 August, the German Reichstag passed seventeen war bills, which 
included an Enabling Law,
5
 allowing the executive to issue emergency decrees.
6
 Over the next 
four years, 825 decrees were issued under this law to regulate the economy, labour and welfare. 
Legislation passed on the same day also included laws to protect soldiers from civil suits, as 
well as a number of law concerning the wartime economy and social matters, including a law 
                                                 
5
  Art 3 of this read: ‘The Federal Council is hereby authorized to adopt during the war such 
economic measures as may be necessary in order to avert economic damage’. J W Scobell 
Armstrong, War and Treaty Legislation affecting British Property in Germany and Austria and 
Enemy Property in the United Kingdom (Hutchinson & Co [1921])  20. 
6
 Art 63 of the 1850 Prussian constitution had made provision for special ordinances to be 
issued in an emergency. Art 68 of the 1871 Bismarckian constitution gave the emperor the 
power to declare a state of war, whose conditions followed those of the Prussian Law of Siege 
of 1851. On the declaration of national emergency, executive power passed into the hands of 
the corps commanders in each of 24 military districts (in practice, the Deputy Commanding 
Generals): R Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918, 2
nd
 ed (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 33. 
on price ceilings. A state of siege was invoked, giving military commanders the power to issue 
decrees, to requisition and to fix prices.
7
 Extraordinary courts were also set up, staffed by three 
officers and two civilians.
8
 The state of siege permitted the authorities to restrict personal 
liberty - including detention and press censorship. Austria also passed special wartime 
legislation, in the form of decrees made by the government, using provisions of the 1867 
constitution. By 1917, the government in Vienna had issued over 500 decrees regulating 
various aspects of the wartime economy.  In France, the outbreak of war was accompanied by 
a declaration of martial law, as well as further conscription laws, and laws to facilitate the 
continued operation of civil courts (threatened by a loss of manpower young men went to the 
front) as well as allow the state to raise loans and to control exports. During the course of the 
war, 747 decrees and ordinances would be issued in France to deal with wartime problems.
9
 In 
Britain, parliament authorized the King in Council to issue regulations to secure the public 
safety and authorise trial in military courts of persons contravening regulations designed to 
prevent communications with the enemy or the safety of communications.
10
 Further legislation 
in the autumn and spring empowered the military authorities to requisition factories for the 
production of arms, or to require a factory owner to run it on behalf of the state. By May 1917, 
206 Regulations had been issued under four Defence of the Realm Acts. In contrast to Britain, 
France, Germany and Austria, Italy did not join the war until 26 April 1915, when she joined 
Britain and France in the Triple Entente, to fight her former allies Germany and Austria. But it 
                                                 
7
  The government was authorised to requisition certain specific articles and services for the 
war effort under the Law relating to War Contributions of 1873. However, a decree of 24 June 
1915 (issued under the Enabling Law) authorized the requisition of any article likely to be of 
use for the war effort, and provided for settling a price by arbitration. 
8
 H W Koch, A Constitutional History of Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
(Longman, 1984), 188. In all, sixty such courts hard 150,000 cases in the war. 
9
 Eric Alary, La Grande Guerre des Civils, 1914-1919 (Perrin, 2013) 227. 
10
 Defence of the Realm Act 1914. 
did not take long for her government to be given extraordinary powers: within a month, Italy 
also passed legislation which authorised the government to issue regulations for the defence of 
the state and the protection of public order. 
 
The need to maximise the war effort thus brought a significant expansion of state intervention 
throughout Europe. In war conditions, the international economy which had operated so 
extensively before the war was interrupted, so that the great powers had to rely much more on 
the home economy. The supply of food was a pressing concern throughout Europe, leading to 
price controls and restrictions on free markets, which extended from belligerent countries, such 
as Austria, to neutrals, such as the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, legislation was passed in 
1914 to regulate the supply and prices of essential goods and further measures in the same year 
authorised government requisitioning of goods. In France, the government regulated the price 
of grain from 1915, and in the autumn began to requisition wheat and grain. In April 1916, 
statutory price controls and a policy of requisitioning were also imposed on other essential 
foodstuffs.
11
 In 1917, a Ministère de Ravitaillement was set up, to co-ordinate the activities of 
various ministries and municipalities.
12
 When imports of foodstuffs were blocked by the 
German submarine campaign of 1917, rationing was introduced for sugar and subsequently (in 
1918) of bread. In Germany, where both imports and domestic production fell dramatically as a 
result of the British wartime blockade, the government imposed price ceilings, regulated 
production and introduced rationing.
13
 When the system of price ceilings was found not to 
work, the government took increasing control of food production and supply.  In 1915, a War 
                                                 
11
 See David Deroussin’s article in this collection, which also discusses the penalties imposed 
for illicit speculation. 
12
 Alary (n 8), 227. 
13
 See Hans-Peter Haverkamp’s article in this collection, describing rationing, price controls 
and their effects. 
Grain Corporation (Kriegsgetreidegesellschaft) was set up to buy and distribute wheat, and 
similar bodies were set up for other foodstuffs.  With increasingly severe shortages of food 
and declining production, a War Food Office (Kriegsernährungsamt) was set up in May 1916 
to co-ordinate the distribution of food. However, local officials (Deputy Commanding 
General) determined local prices and distribution.
14
 There were also controls over retailers, 
with a law against profiteering (Preistreiberei verordnung) passed in July 1915, and price 
examination agencies (Preisprüfungsstellen) established after September to regulate retail 
prices.  However, such was the complexity of the administrative network regulating the food 
supply,  that the system proved ineffective, and generated much resentment, not least because 
farmers were happy to resort to the thriving black market which continued to exist. 
 
In Britain, legislation at the start of the war authorised the army to requisition food and stores, 
and the Board of Trade to take possession of foodstuffs unreasonably withheld from the 
market.
15
 A Cabinet Committee on Food was set up at the beginning of the war, which took 
over all sugar imports,
16
 and in the following year a Departmental Committee proposed a 
system of guaranteed minimum prices (underwritten by the government) for a period of four 
years.
17
 By the end of 1916 (when the German submarine campaign had made the problem of 
food supplies even more pressing), a Ministry of Food was set up, and a Food Controller 
appointed, with extensive powers under the Defence of the Realm Regulations. Regulations 
                                                 
14
 See Gerald D Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German 
Inflation, 1914-1924 (Oxford University Press, 1993) 57-63, David Stevenson, With Our 
Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (Allen Lane, 2011). 
15
 Army (Supply of Food, Forage and Stores) Act, Unreasonable Withholding of Foodstuffs 
Act. 
16
 Samuel J Hurwitz, State intervention in Great Britain: A study of economic control and 
Social Response, 1914-1919 (Columbia University Press, 1949) ch 13. 
17
 Departmental Committee on the Home Production of Food, PP 1914-16 [Cd. 8048, Cd. 
8095] V 779, 787, 
introduced in January 1917 empowered him to make orders regulating the production and 
distribution of food, as well as to set prices. Those whose stocks were requisitioned were to be 
paid cost price plus a reasonable profit.
18
 The Board of Agriculture and Fisheries also had the 
power to take possession of land and property to increase the food supply. Moreover, the 1917 
Corn Production Act guaranteed a minimum price to farmers for wheat and oats, while fixing 
rents below the rate of inflation - so that it would be the large landowners rather than the 
farmers who would bear the cost. By the end of the war, 80% of all food consumed in Britain 
was bought and sold by the government, and 90% was subject to price regulation.
19
 Many 
producers and suppliers became in effect government agents, working either on commission or 
at prices fixed by the government. Numerous committees and commissions were set up, 
including a Royal Commission on Sugar Supplies (which had a monopoly of the purchase and 
distribution of sugar), and a Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic). The latter was set up in 
response to the government’s concern to limit the consumption of alcohol, particularly among 
soldiers and munitions workers. It had the power to control the sale and consumption of liquor, 
and to take over breweries and public houses in designated areas. Indeed, the government 
seriously considered complete nationalisation of the drinks trade during the war,
20
 but in the 
end only took over the industry in three key areas.  
 
Ensuring that the military were adequately supplied with munitions was also a pressing 
concern for all states at war. State control over industry grew. In Germany, a Raw Materials 
                                                 
18
 See E M H Lloyd, Experiments in State Control at the War Office and Ministry of Food 
(Clarendon Press,1924), ch 25. 
19
 R H Tawney, ‘The Abolition of Economic Controls, 1918-21' in J M Winter (ed), History 
and Society: Essays by R H Tawney (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) 129-86. 
20
 See John Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade in the First World war’ (1980) 23 
Historical Journal 589-615.  
Section (Kriegsrohstoffabteilung) was set up within the War Ministry, and co-ordinated a 
number of war corporations to control, purchase and distribute war-related raw materials. 
Some 200 Kriegsrohstoffgesellschaften were set up, run by businessmen who were paid a fixed 
return on their investments in these ventures.
21
 The German state also drew on the tradition of 
industrial syndicates and cartels, as in the Coal Industry, where industrialists maintained an 
organisation on the verge of fracture, when faced with the threat of government control as an 
alternative.
22
 A Reich Commissioner for coal was subsequently appointed to ensure continued 
supplies. In Austria, the military was empowered to take over the administration of private 
companies, with the owners of the firms being paid a remuneration reflecting previous average 
profits. This country also saw war associations and central agencies which sought to guarantee 
the optimal use of industrial resources by an increasingly centralised system of control. The 
British state also became increasingly involved in regulating industry, to ensure supplies for 
the war effort.  At the beginning of the war, Britain’s 3000 coal mines were owned by some 
1500 companies: after the war broke out, numerous measures were taken to control the coal 
trade (by limiting exports and prices, and controlling the price of shipping coal), and after 
December 1916 collieries came under the control of the Board of Trade with a Coal 
Controller.
23
 The Ministry of Munitions, created in 1915, was given the power to declare any 
factory a ‘controlled establishment’, to supply material at fixed rate of profit.24 Although the 
vast majority of factories producing munitions continued to be privately owned and run 
(though there were also some state enterprises), munitions legislation controlled labour and 
                                                 
21
 These corporations parcelled out much of the manufacturing work to participating firms: 
Chickering (n 6) 38. 
22
 Feldman (n 14) 57. 
23
 The method of compensation was settled by agreement with the mineowners and confirmed 
by the Coal Mines Control Agreement (Conformation) Act of 1918. 
24
 Munitions of War Act 1915. 
production in these factories, interfering considerably in the contract of employment.
25
 In 
1916, a Ministry of Shipping was set up, with a shipping Controller with power to requisition 
ocean going mercantile ships. After the submarine campaign reached its height in April 1917, 
almost all the British sea-going tonnage above 300 tons was requisitioned, to be run either 
directly or through the agency of the owners. The control of shipping was extended after the 
Paris conference in November 1917 led to the creation of the Maritime Transport Council and 
Executive, to allocate tonnage to different countries. 
 
In France, the realisation that the war would be prolonged increased government involvement 
in industry. To begin with, it had to release conscripts to return back from the front, ensuring a 
labour supply. The loi Dalbiez of June 1915 released half a million military men to work in the 
factories, though significantly they remained under military discipline.
26
 Furthermore, it was 
soon evident that state arsenals could not supply all the necessary armaments, and in September 
1914 at the Bordeaux Conference, the government developed a strategy with industry for the 
war economy, with the state providing much capital for the expansion of plant, and buying the 
output at favourable prices. Given the loss of production in the north, the state began to work 
with industrial and commercial bodies to establish import monopolies for heavy industry and to 
manage the distribution of imported material among various firms.  18 groups of industries 
(made up of 375 companies) were organised, with leading companies in each industry 
receiving orders from the state and then distributing them to the other companies within the 
groups. Production was subsequently co-ordinated by a new Ministry of Armaments set up in 
December 1916, which controlled prices and production, but which left the actual work in the 
                                                 
25
 On this see G R Rubin, War, Law and Labour: The Munitions Act, State Regulation and the 
Unions, 1915-1921 (Oxford University Press, 1987). 
26
 See Smith, Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker (n 2) 62-3 for the material in this paragraph. 
hands of private firms operating for a profit. 
 
The states’ war efforts thus had considerable impact on the existing private rights of their 
citizens: in this modern warfare, the needs of the state would be primary. Wartime legislation 
allowed governments considerable power to take private property for public defence. Using 
powers derived from requisitioning was the law of 13 June 1873 (Gesetz über die 
Kriegsleistungen), the German Raw Materials Section requisitioned not only industrial 
equipment, but all kinds of metallic objects which could be used for munitions. Similar steps 
were taken in Austria, where compensation for property taken for the war effort was 
determined, under legislation passed soon after the outbreak of war, by administrative bodies 
with no recourse to the courts.
27
 French case law had also established a right to compensation 
for loss of the use of property requisitioned by the state. In Britain questions were soon raised 
over the level of` compensation which was to be given for property taken for the public 
defence. In the view of government lawyers, the crown had the prerogative power to take 
property in times of emergency, without having to pay compensation as a matter of legal right. 
This view was confirmed in 1915 by the Court of Appeal in a decision which was very 
controversial - the government’s lawyers settled with the claimants who had brought the case 
against them when they discovered that the House of Lords would overrule the decision when 
the case came before them.
28
                                                 
27
 See Schennach’s contribution to this collection. 
28
 In re a Petition of Right [1915] 3 KB 649. For hostile comment, see (1916) 32 Law Quarterly 
Review 339. On the case, see G R Rubin, Private Property, Government Requisition, and the 
Constitution, 1914-1927 (Hambledon Press, 1994) ch 4. 
In Britain governments were constantly aware of the need to avoid a decision coming to the 
courts which would established the right of litigants to compensation for the seizure of their 
property, or harm done by the government to their economic interests. The greatest concern 
was the sheer size of the potential cost. This did not mean that property was taken without 
compensation, for in March 1915 the government set up a royal commission under Henry Duke 
MP to settle what sums should be paid in respect of losses to businesses or properties as a result 
of the crown’s exercise of its rights to defend the realm.  This commission however gave 
payments as a matter of grace rather than of right, and on a scale much lower than would be 
awarded in the court.
29
 After the war ended, the House of Lords held that the crown in fact had 
no legal right to seize property without compensation;
30
 but the decision was soon followed by 
an Indemnity Act preventing the reopening of claims. As GR Rubin has shown, the crown’s 
lawyers were constantly aware in wartime that their actions exceeded the powers given to them 
by DORA and the Regulations and that they faced potentially numerous challenges to the vires 
of their acts. However, they managed for the most part to postpone the legal problem until the 
war had ended.
31
 At the same time, in many industries, such as shipping, levels of 
compensation could be determined by arbitration or negotiations.  An Admiralty Transport 
Arbitration Board was set up in Britain in 1914, including representatives from the shipping 
industry, to set rates for hire, which resulted in the ‘Blue Book’ rates to be paid for ships 
requisitioned by the state. This Board laid down the conditions and rates of hire for different 
kinds of vessels, accepting a ‘fair profit’. If shipowners grumbled about the impact of inflation 
                                                 
29
  It only awarded sums representing losses, rather than lost profits Defence of the Realm 
Losses Commission. First Report of the commissioners. PP 1916 [Cd 8359] VII. 1 See Rubin 
(n 25) ch 12. 
30
 Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, Ltd. [1920] AC 508. 
31
 Newcastle Breweries v The King [1960] 1 KB 854,  Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) 
v Cannon Brewery Co Ltd [1919] AC 744, Chester v Bateson [1920] 1 KB 829. For 
unsuccessful wartime challenges, see Lipton v Ford [1917] 2 KB 647. 
on these rates, they benefits from inflation when it came to the compensation to be paid if ships 
were sunk. 
     
Alongside the issue of compensation for property requisitioned, the war raised questions of 
whether and how the public might be compensated for damage to property caused by the war 
itself.  In Austria (as Martin Schennach shows), there was some debate over the delictual 
liability of the state for war damage, and about how far the state should compensate for losses 
caused by enemy action; but most regarded this as a matter for public law.  In France (as 
David Deroussin shows), the war also generated a debate about the state’s duty to compensate 
those whose property was damaged by acts of war, leading to legislation in 1919 which gave 
such a right to compensation, reflecting a notion that there had to be a spirit of national 
solidarity when faced with war. The British state enjoyed an immunity from tort which derived 
from the ancient notion that the crown could do no wrong, though in theory the individual 
wrongdoer could be sued.
32
 This principle survived the war.  At the beginning of the war, the 
government set up a war risks insurance scheme, to cover shipping,
33
 and in the following year 
a Government Aircraft Insurance Scheme was set up to offer insurance for damage caused by 
enemy bombing.
34
 The scheme was perceived by many to be unsatisfactory, and there were 
continued calls, particularly from local authorities, for the state to pay compensation for war 
damage from national funds. A modified scheme was introduced in November 1917, to help 
                                                 
32
 For the application of this rule in Scotland, see Macgregor v Lord Advocate 1921 SC 847. 
33
 This was in effect a reinsurance scheme, to underwrite other insurers. Insured ships had to 
obey Admiralty instructions as to their voyages: see (1914) 58 Solicitor’s Journal 765 (15 
August 1914). France also introduced such a scheme (1914) 59 Solicitors Journal 230. 
34
 It was managed by the General Accident Insurance Company: Hansard vol. 74 (5
th
 ser), col. 
724 (28 Sept. 1915). 
those with smaller properties, but without going early as far as had been called for.
35 
 
Particular questions were raised for workplace injuries. Different states reacted differently to 
the question of workmen’s compensation, when questions arose whether the injury resulted 
from an accident in the workplace, or from war risks. In Britain, whose pre-war Workmen’s 
Compensation legislation only applied to British territories, an Injuries in War (Compensation) 
Act was passed to allow the crown to frame schemes to provide pensions for soldiers injured in 
the war.
36
 Otherwise, no new scheme was introduced for wartime conditions,
37
 but claimants 
were left to the existing 1906 Act, which required them to show that the injury arose out of and 
in the course of employment.
38
 French courts (as Deroussin shows) also debated which injuries 
arose from the course of employment, generating mixed results. A system which decided 
compensation on a case by case basis was bound to lead to inconsistent decisions. Other 
countries, such as Germany, had more bureaucratic systems of compensation which 
compensated those harmed by enemy bombs. 
                                                 
35
 See Hansard vol. 98 (5
th
 ser) col. 1766 (5 Nov 1917). In the Second World War, a War 
Damage Commission was set up under the War Damage Act 1941 to pay compensation for 
bomb damage. See ‘War Damage to Property: Government Compensation Scheme’: PP 
1939-40 [Cmd. 6136] V 543. Given the likely scale of bomb damage, property was considered 
to be largely uninsurable on the private market. See The Times 16 March 1938, p 11. 
36
 See  Tomalin v Pearson [1909] 2 KB 61;  Schwartz v The India Rubber, Gutta Percha and 
Telegraph Works Company, Ltd [1912] 2 KB 299. 
37
 There were however some amendments to the legislation: see P W J Bartrip, Workmen’s 
Compensation in Twentieth Century Britain (Aldershot, 1987) 74-82. 
38
 Thus, a potman who was cleaning the brass plate outside the public house where he worked 
failed to recover compensation when injured by a bomb which fell (Allcock v Rogers (1917) 62 
Solicitor’s Journal 173, 601; WN 1 Dec 1917, p 353, 6 Apr 1918 p. 96;  Law Times 5 Dec 
1917, p. 111, 6 April 1918, p 401). The family of another workman, killed by a bomb while out 
on his employer’s business, failed to obtain compensation: Knyvett v Wilkinson Brothers (Ltd) 
(1918) 62 Solicitor’s Journal 60, Law Times 4 May 1918, p. 6, where the Lords applied its own 
(non-war-related) decision in Dennis v A J White and Company [1917] AC 479). By contrast, 
the widow of the chief engineer of a ship which struck a mine and was lost was compensated: 
Newstead v Owners of the Steam Trawler Labrador [1916] 1 KB 166. 
 The war also had a significant impact on family law. Old rigid rules, relating to marriage and 
the legitimation of children, which had already come under some pressure after the turn of the 
century in some countries, were removed in wartime conditions.  In France, several measures 
were passed to facilitate marriages, allowing for marriages between parties who were separated 
by war (as when a soldier was on the front), and even regularising marriages celebrated when 
(unbeknown to the wife and the person officiating) the ‘husband’ had already been killed. With 
husbands away from the marital home and unable to exercise paternal powers, women were 
able to acquire greater powers in the household. Wartime experience led to the liberalisation of 
the law relating to adoption. As Carlotta Latini shows, Italy also saw similar reforms in family 
law, with the war leading to the abolition of marital authorisation (opening the way for far 
greater participation of women in the workplace). The war also made issues of child protection 
more urgent, particularly of war orphans and illegitimate children, which resulted in reforms 
which would survive the war. 
 
The expansion of the ‘public law’ activities of the state clearly had a disruptive impact on 
private law during the war, as the state interfered with free markets and co-ordinated 
commercial activity. The impact of the war on private law and private law rights and duties was 
therefore considerable. However, private law relations remained a crucial underpinning: ‘war 
socialism’ did not erase property rights, and in many instances private economic relations were 
not replaced with a state-owned system. Instead, a wartime public law structure was laid over 
the top of a private law base, through which most economic activity continued to take place. As 
one historian has put it, ‘[b]usinessmen oversaw the business of war everywhere’: the 
allocation of resources, in war, as in peace, was driven by considerations of profit.
39
 State 
                                                 
39
 Chickering (n 6) 39. 
agencies were the main consumers of industrial output, but they also guaranteed set rates of 
profit. Economic activity continued, contracts continued to be made and broken, and courts had 
to deal with the consequences of legal disputes. In doing so, they often sought to defend and 
develop traditional private law doctrines, and to adapt old law to new purposes. 
 
II 
 
For private commercial parties, the most pressing questions concerned what impact the war 
had on their existing contractual relationships. The most immediate problem raised by the war 
was that the many parties were unable under the new economic conditions to pay their debts or 
fulfil their contracts. The outbreak of war was bound to impede the payment of debts across 
borders, which threatened to create a contraction of credit and a collapse in the price of 
securities. Consequently, stock markets all over Europe were closed, to avoid their collapse.
40
 
At the same time, a number of states introduced temporary moratoria on the payment of debts. 
The effectiveness of moratoria in sustaining the system of credit in emergencies had been 
established in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1, when the French legislature had periodically 
postponed the date of payment of bills of exchange, to ensure that they did not become payable 
till the end of the war.
41
 In 1914, such moratoria were again introduced in France, where 
numerous laws extended the period for payment of negotiable instruments.
42
 and in the 
Netherlands, where debtors were permitted to petition the court for a renewable six month 
moratorium.  In England, the Postponement of Payments Act - which postponed payments on 
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negotiable instruments for a month and allowed for further postponements - was passed in a 
single day (3 August).
43
 Three days later, the reach of the moratorium was extended to cover a 
wider range of contracts.
44
 Germany did not pass a general moratory law - something which 
was a matter of pride for Reichsbank President Havenstein -  though the Reichsbank did (like 
other central banks) suspend gold and silver payments.
45
 However, a number of measures were 
passed in Germany to suspend the payment of debts.
46
 
 
It was not only short term commercial debts which were postponed. Wartime conditions 
allowed for the postponement of the payment of various forms of debt throughout Europe. 
Particular attention was paid to the financial position of soldiers. In France, legislation was 
passed at the start of the war to protect those who had been mobilised. As Deroussin shows, 
particular attention was paid here to protecting rural leases held by farmers who had been 
mobilised, to avoid the disruption of farming. In Germany, legislation also passed on 4 August 
conferred special rights on persons in military service (echoing one of 1870) protecting them 
from proceedings in civil, commercial and industrial courts.
47
 In Britain (where conscription 
began only in 1916), legislation was also passed to protect soldiers from actions for debts, even 
if their inability to pay could not be attributed to war conditions.
48
  Nor was it only the military 
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 Courts (Emergency Powers) (Amendment) Act 1916. For critical comment, see Solicitor’s 
Journal, vol. 60, p. 412. Britain also passed legislation facilitating the termination of leases 
held by those in the military. In 1918, an act was passed to amend the law relating to 
who were protected, for legislation was passed to postpone the liabilities of those on the home 
front. Following the example of legislation passed in 1870, France introduced a complex series 
of moratoria on rents, to protect those unable to pay because of wartime conditions, while 
attempting at the same time to balance the rights of landlords. In Italy, special courts were set 
up to deal with disputes over rural leases in an equitable manner, in effect taking the matter out 
of the ordinary courts and giving power to arbitrators chosen by the parties. In Britain, the 
Courts (Emergency Powers) Act of August 1914 enacted that no one could seek execution on a 
judgment, or distrain for rent, or foreclose on a mortgage without the leave of a court. The act 
applied to debts arising from before the war, and was to be used where the debtor was unable to 
pay for reasons attributable to the war.
49
  
 
The number of litigants resorting to these legislative special regimes was considerable. For 
instance, in England, in 1918, there were 97,303 orders under the Courts (Emergency Powers) 
Act 1914 in the County Courts, as against 101,957 cases determined on a hearing.
50
 The 
legislation had to be prolonged after the end of the war, for fear that creditors might now swoop 
on their debtors to recover their debts. In fact, in January 1918 a committee appointed by the 
Board of Trade reported that they had been ‘much impressed’ by the ‘readiness of businessmen 
not to insist on the strict letter of a contract, the performance of which has been affected by the 
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war’, since they had seen it in its ‘true patriotic light’.51 This was perhaps over-optimistic, since 
the statute continued to have some life after the war.
52
  
 
Besides introducing legislation to suspend the payment of debts, legislation was passed in a 
number of countries to contracts to be terminated or amended because of war conditions. In 
France, legislation was proposed in 1915 (following an earlier Italian decree) to allow for the 
rescission or revision of commercial contracts because of wartime conditions, though the act 
which finally passed in 1918 did not allow courts to rewrite the contract. In Britain, legislation 
in 1917 allowed the court to vary, suspend or annul not only any building contract entered into 
before the war which could not be ‘enforced according to its terms without serious hardship’ 
owing to restrictions in the supply of labour or materials, but also ‘any contract’ which could 
not be performed because of any restriction imposed in pursuance of any act or regulation 
passed for the defence of the realm.
53
  Italian legislation also aimed at protecting the weaker 
party to a contract, by setting up fast and fair tribunals in place of the formalism of civil trials 
applying the fixed code. 
 
Many contractual relationships were thus regulated by statutes passed in the war.
54
 These 
developments, which sat alongside traditional private law doctrine, raised the question of how 
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far doctrinal developments would be influenced by new equitable ideas introduced in wartime. 
The area of private law perhaps most affected by the war was the contractual doctrine of force 
majeure or frustration. This concept was well established in the codified civilian systems. Arts. 
1147-8 of the French code civil provided that no damages were payable if a party to the 
contract had been prevented from performing because of an ‘external cause which could not be 
imputed to him’55 or because of ‘force majeure or cas fortuit’ [‘superior force or chance 
occurrence’]. 56 This provision was echoed in other codes based on the French one, such as the 
Dutch civil code and the Italian civil code. The Austrian civil code (s 1447) also made 
provision for the impossibility of fulfilling a contract if there were unforeseen impediments 
lying beyond the will of the parties. The notion of force majeure was derived from the notion of 
vis maior in Roman law,
57
 which also contained rules establishing who was to bear the risk of 
unforeseen events in certain contracts, such as leases.
58
 Where civilian systems of law could 
draw on centuries of discussions on the allocation of risk, the common law notion of 
‘frustration’ was of much more recent growth and much less developed by 1914.59 Moreover, 
whereas the civilian doctrine was premised on the notion that force majeure rendered a breach 
non-culpable, the English doctrine was based on a notion of an implied term in the contract 
between the parties, which would discharge it when it became impossible to perform. English 
                                                 
55
 ‘Une cause étrangère qui ne peut lui être imputée’: Art. 1147 Code civil. 
56
 Art. 1302 of the code also made provision for the destruction of ascertained goods. 
57
 See D.44.7.1.4, C.4.65.1, D. 19.2.36. 
58
  See D. 19.2.15.2 on whether the lessor or the tenant was to bear losses caused by various 
kinds of accident, from the flooding of rivers to earthquakes. On these issues, see Paul du 
Plessis, Letting and Hiring in Roman Legal Thought 27 BCE - 284 CE (Brill, 2012), 38ff and 
his  A History of Remissio Mercedis and Related Institutions (Kluwer, 2003). 
59
 See C MacMillan, ‘Taylor v Caldwell (1863)’ in Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell (eds), 
Landmark Cases in the Law of Contract (Hart Publishing, 2008) and M Lobban, ‘Contractual 
Terms and their Performance’ in W. Cornish et al, The Oxford History of the Laws of England 
vol. XII (Oxford, 2010),  508-521. 
judges tended to focus on whether the parties could be seen to have agreed on the 
circumstances under which a contract would be discharged, rather than asking whether the 
event was such as to remove the presumption that the party in breach had committed a fault. 
 
The war raised new questions about the ambit of force majeure and frustration, as governments 
throughout Europe began to prohibit trade with enemy states and requisition supplies, and as 
the disruption of trade, as well as wartime inflation, made it increasingly difficult for 
contracting parties to fulfil the engagements they had originally entered into. Although (as has 
been seen), there was much legislation providing for the adjustment of contractual obligations, 
the civil law courts also had to consider how far parties were to be held strictly to their 
contractual obligations, and how far parties could be relieved from what had become severe 
burdens. One immediate question to be answered was whether the war itself constituted force 
majeure. As David Deroussin and Catharine MacMillan show, neither the French nor the 
English courts were sympathetic to arguments that the mere fact of war excused the 
performance of contractual obligations. Judges were keen to uphold contracts wherever 
possible, from a fear of the consequences of allowing parties to evade obligations which had 
simply become more onerous. In general, courts sought to resolve these problems by resorting 
to traditional private law doctrine, rather than developing wider policies which might attempt 
to reconcile the interests of traders and the wider nation. In France, there was much debate over 
whether courts should apply the theory of imprévision, according to which a judge could 
modify the terms of a contract which had become seriously onerous to one of the parties, as a 
result of new circumstances which could not have been foreseen. As Deroussin shows, some 
trial courts (as well as administrative courts) favoured excusing the performance of contracts 
which had become unduly onerous; but the appeal courts rejected this approach, preferring a 
stricter interpretation of force majeure. In England (as MacMillan shows), judges hearing the 
early requisition cases evidently sought to find a solution which was financially fairest to both 
parties, but they were not keen to develop a new, broad theory of frustration beyond the 
‘implied term’ theory. As the war progressed, judges showed themselves increasingly willing 
to discharge contracts which had been disrupted by state action - most usually where ships had 
been requisitioned - but were not willing to discharge them where the interference was not 
related to government action, as (for instance) when it became impossible (as a result of the 
war) to procure a supply of goods. The war thus provided an impetus for the development of 
the law of frustration - inevitably so, given the large amount of litigation generated by the war 
- but it did not lead to a major rethinking of the foundations of the doctrine.  Judges were keen 
to maintain ‘private law as normal’, so far as was possible. 
 
A more equitable or interventionist approach was taken elsewhere. In Italy (Latini argues), the 
war did see a significant extension of the doctrine of force majeure, allowing parties to 
discharge contracts not only which had become impossible, but those which had become 
prohibitively expensive. In Austria, the supreme court also allowed for the discharge of 
contracts not only when performance was impossible, but also where it could impose 
unreasonable costs on one of the parties. The war also had a major impact on rethinking these 
notions in Germany, where courts moved away from an earlier strict approach to questions of 
vis maior to a more equitable one. The German civil code, the BGB, contained various clauses 
regarding impossibility of performance,
60
 though it had deliberately omitted any clausula 
rebus sic stantibus. However, it did contain provisions that the contract had to be performed in 
good faith.
61
 Though in the early years of the war, German courts were unwilling to allow 
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61
 Art. 242: ‘The debtor is bound to carry out performance in the manner required by good 
parties to evade contractual obligations simply because of an increase in prices, as the war went 
on, judges became more willing to intervene and set aside contracts which had become 
disproportionately onerous to one of the parties.
62
 Although historians have often argued that it 
was in the era of the Weimar Republic that judges changed their approach increasingly towards 
one invoking good faith, Hans-Peter Haferkamp argues here that it occurred earlier, during the 
Great War. In contrast to English judges, German judges saw themselves as having a distinct 
role in stabilising the home front when faced with economic crisis, looking beyond the settled 
parameters of traditional private law doctrine. They developed an open and independent policy 
when dealing with cases relating to pressing economic questions. In an era when the legislature 
seemed unable to respond adequately, the judges in the Reichsgericht sought to maintain the 
‘inner unity’ of German society, and to ensure that people did not seek to promote their own 
private interests at the expense of the wider interests of the war economy: for instance, they 
used the general clauses of the BGB to void contracts where one side sought to make an 
excessive profit. 
 
The disruption caused to the economy by war also had serious effects on the contracts of 
traders in neutral countries, forcing the courts to rethink force majeure. In the Netherlands, as 
Willem van Boom shows, the outbreak of war among foreign states clearly did not constitute 
force majeure, nor was trading with the enemy illegal: but (as in other countries), contracts 
were interfered with by requisitioning and restrictions imposed by the state. As in the 
belligerent countries, so in the Netherlands the courts strove to maintain contractual 
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performance, even where the provision of supplies had become extremely difficult.
63
 Dutch 
traders were expected to make provision for possible wartime problems: they could not argue 
that they were not to be expected. However, the wartime cases did spur Dutch scholars to 
rethink the law regarding extraordinary, unforeseen events which render contractual 
performance far more onerous than anticipated, leading them to look to applying the principle 
of good faith, found in the Dutch civil code. In the 1920s, both courts and scholars in the 
Netherlands pondered whether to accept an approach akin to the French theory of imprévision - 
but (as in France), the superior courts resisted the idea of modifying contacts in light of 
changed circumstances until the last quarter of the twentieth century. As in other countries, so 
in the Netherlands new wartime problems made jurists reconsider old problems - as war 
conditions revealed inadequacies in old doctrinal frameworks - though without inducing them 
in the short term significantly to recast the law. 
 
Besides making it impossible or extremely onerous to perform many contracts, the war also 
rendered many contracts illegal - particularly in the case of those effected with enemy buyers or 
sellers. At the beginning of the war, different countries had different views regarding trading 
with the enemy. Neither Germany nor Austria prohibited trading with the enemy, and allowed 
enemy aliens the right to sue and be sued in local courts. The English common law took a 
tougher view. At common law, trading with alien enemies was illegal - any contract made with 
an alien enemy was void.
64
 A Royal Proclamation of 5 August confirmed this by warning the 
king’s subjects from trading in goods destined for Germany, and it was followed within two 
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weeks by a Trading with the Enemy Act.  In France, a decree of 27 September 1914 prohibited 
all commerce with the subjects of enemy states and nullified any contract made with an enemy 
subject since the outbreak of war, while also allowing those entered before this time to be 
voided. Germany and Austria both responded with an ordinance prohibiting the making of 
payments to Britain and France and their colonies; and laws followed which dealt with the 
seizure of goods, the sequestration of property, the annulment of contracts with enemy aliens 
and the winding up of enemy undertakings.
65
 France also responded with a decree declaring 
null and void any contract made with the subject of any enemy state, as well as subjects of 
states (such as the Ottoman empire) not formally at war with France.
66
 Enemy property was 
also sequestered. In Britain, an Order-in-Council at the outbreak of the war placed three 
German and two Austrian banks under the supervision of a controller, whose task was to realise 
assets to be able to pay the banks’ English, allied and neutral creditors arising from pre-war 
transactions (and ultimately, after 1916, to liquidate the banks).
67
 The Board of Trade was 
given the power to take over enemy owned firms, where it was in the public interest for the 
business to be carried on.
68
 The state acquired considerable powers in the war to take over and 
wind up companies who were thought to be trading with the enemy, whether directly or 
indirectly.
69
 All businesses owned by enemy subjects were investigated, and in many cases 
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foreign-owned firms were transformed into British companies, by being sold off to local 
investors.
70
 French decrees in October 1914 also allowed for the sequestration of enemy 
property. Germany retaliated to the measures taken against its banks by the British in 
September 1914, by making provision for enemy controlled undertakings to be put under state 
supervision. Further decrees followed allowing for the state to take control of undertakings 
controlled by French and British nationals, with the administrator being given power to carry 
on, lease or wind up the business. However, rather than liquidating such firms, the policy of the 
government was to ‘preserve the businesses in question as an asset for meeting the indemnities 
to be exacted frm the enemy upon the termination of the war.’71 However, in July 1916 (in 
retaliation for the British policy of winding up enemy firms, embodied in the 1916 Trading 
with the Enemy Act), a decree was issued authorizing the winding up of any British-owned or 
-controlled undertaking. Germany also appointed a Custodian of Enemy Property in 1917 (two 
and a half years after the British had done so). Austria also passed a decree in October 1914 to 
allow government control of enemy corporations, and passed further decrees during the course 
of the war to allow these companies to be liquidated or sold. 
 
Complex questions remained over who was an alien enemy. In England, at the end of August 
1914, a Treasury memorandum giving guidance confirmed the view from existing case law 
that what mattered was not the nationality of the person, or firm, being dealt with, but its 
location.
72
 It was illegal to deal with any individual or firm resident in an enemy country, but 
there was no objection to dealing with German or Austrian firms established in British or 
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neutral territory, or even with branches of German firms operating in England, provided that 
there was no transaction with the head office. This meant that a German national who had 
registered under the Aliens Restriction Act 1914 was permitted to sue in the courts of England, 
by virtue of a licence from the crown,
73
 though alien enemies lacking this licence could not sue.  
By contrast, an alien enemy could be sued in the English courts, for while it was thought to go 
against good policy to allow an enemy to use the King’s courts to enforce his rights, it made 
perfect sense to allow the King’s subjects to enforce their rights in court against the enemy.74 
 
Questions were also raised over what counted as an enemy company. In Britain, corporate 
entities were regarded as entirely distinct from their shareholders,
75
 which suggested that a 
corporation registered in England should be regarded as an English firm, even if all its owners 
were German or Austrian. Early in the war, some in the legal community, who were keen to 
maintain business as usual, argued that this rule was a good one, and that no account should be 
taken of the nationality of shareholders in a company in determining whether it was unlawful to 
deal with the firm.
76
 Although the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914 had given the Board of 
Trade power to inspect the books (and if necessary to appoint a controller) where more than 1/3 
of a company’s capital was owned by enemies, the Royal Proclamation of September 1914 had 
only prohibited trade with companies incorporated in enemy countries. However, in 1916, in 
the context of increasing demands in the country and in parliament for German owned, but 
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British registered companies to be treated as alien enemy entities, the House of Lords 
confirmed that the nationality of the shareholders was relevant: war allowed for the tearing 
away of the corporate veil.
77
 In the view of this court, the key question was not the country of a 
company’s registration, but the question of control. ‘The acts of a company’s organs, its 
directors, managers, secretary and so forth, functioning within the scope of their authority,’ 
Lord Parker of Waddington ruled, ‘are the company’s acts and may invest it definitively with 
enemy character.’78 German companies were permitted to sue in French courts under the 
Treaty of Frankfurt of 1871, but this right could not survive the outbreak of a new war. After 
1914, courts had to determine if the company was French or German, and - like the English - 
courts here began to debate whether a company’s nationality was determined by the location of 
its registration or by the nationality of its owners. As Deroussin shows, this question was a 
subject of contention among judges and courts, with the vie generally prevailing that it was the 
company’s domicile, rather than the question of control, which determined its nationality. 
 
Complex questions were also raised about the impact of war on a contract with an enemy alien. 
Legislation early in the war in Britain made the Public Trustee was made Custodian of enemy 
property, to receive and hold all moneys, such as profits or dividends, due to alien enemies 
                                                 
77
 The question whether a British registered company might be regarded as an enemy had been 
raised in the Prize case The Tommi. (No. 14.) v The Rothersand (No. 69.) [1914] P 251. It had 
already been decided that enemy shareholders were not entitled in wartime to exercise their 
rights of voting in respect of shares in English companies. Robson v Premier Oil and Pipe Line 
Company, Ltd [1915] 2 Ch 124. 
78
 Daimler Company  v Continental Tyre and Rubber Company (Great Britain) Ltd [1916] 2 
AC 307 at 307 at 340. On the case, see David Foxton, ‘Corporate Personality in the Great War’ 
(2002) 118 Law Quarterly Review 428-57. As he demonstrates, the Lords’ decision did not rest 
on this point; but it was applied in later cases: see Clapham Steamship Co Ltd. v Naamlooze 
Vennotschap Handels-en-Transport-Maatschappij Vulcaan of Rotterdam [1917] 2 KB 639, In 
re Badische Co Ltd [1921] 2 Ch 331. 
until the end of the war, when Orders in Council would determine the fate of the property.
79
 
One a business had come into the hands of the Controller, it was safe enough to deal with it. But 
what of other traders of enemy alien origin? From the beginning of the war, English lawyers 
took the view that while executory contracts were voided by the war, executed ones, in which 
there was money owing to alien enemies, were suspended until the end of the war. German 
shareholders in British companies would continue to be entitled to their dividends, but would 
only be able to collect them at the end of the war.
80
 Courts continued to take the view that at 
common law, existing property rights were only suspended.
81
 The common law view that all 
parties should be restored to their property when peace came was of course highly qualified by 
the role of the Custodian, and the fact that what happened to enemy property would be 
determined by the result of peace negotiations: but the courts of private law continued to apply 
pre-war principles to property. By contrast, executory contracts with alien enemies were held 
not simply to have been suspended for the duration of the war, but to have been terminated.
82
 
When contracts specifically included suspension clauses, they were held to be void as being 
against public policy.
83
 However, much might depend on the particular contract in question: 
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  A suspensory clause which kept a contract alive ‘not for the purpose of making good rights 
already accrued, but for the purpose of securing rights in the future by the maintenance of the 
commercial relation in the present’ were void since they in effect hampered the trade of the 
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thus, for instance, it was held that an alien enemy could keep a life assurance policy effected 
with a British firm going during the war. Since there could be no pay-out until the end of the 
war, there would be no benefit to any alien enemy, while it maintained a policy on which an 
interested British party might be able to sue.
84
 
 
 
III 
 
Faced with the unprecedented demands presented by the Great War, the legal response of 
governments in these countries was often very similar, with the pre-war systems of 
laissez-faire replaced by strong state intervention in the economy, and contractual formalism 
tempered by equitable intervention. Nonetheless, as shall be seen, the responses - particularly 
to the development of existing private law doctrine - were far from uniform. In some countries, 
judges and jurists embraced new equitable or interventionist notions more enthusiastically than 
in others. Equally, some judges took a more policy-minded view than others, for whom 
wartime litigation simply presented a greater variety of cases to accommodate within 
traditional intellectual frameworks.  
 
As the papers in this collection show, the war had an immense impact on the sphere of private 
law. In many areas, freedom of contract and sanctity of property were displaced by a regulated 
war time regime. The very realm of private law seemed in many areas to have been displaced. 
The courts themselves fell relatively silent - the English county courts, for instance, saw only a 
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quarter of the number of cases in 1918 which they had heard in 1913. How long-lasting this 
impact was is another question. In countries such as Great Britain, at the end of the war private 
law largely resumed where it had left off. Private law as a whole was not reshaped by the war - 
even the doctrine of frustration had not yet been put on sure doctrinal foundations - and many 
of the regulatory interventions proved to be temporary. The common law tradition continued to 
develop in its old casuistic, meandering way. Similarly in Austria, the shape of private law 
turned out to be largely unaffected by the war, even if the shape of the old Austro-Hungarian 
empire had been irrevocably changed. But elsewhere - as in the Netherlands and especially in 
Germany - the war had a longer term impact on judicial attitudes to the private codes, and how 
they were to be applied and interpreted. 
 
